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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL C. VAN TASSELL, and 
AFTON VAN TASSELL, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents 
v. 
ELWOOD C. SHAFFER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20334 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS/RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether §78-12-35, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, provides for the tolling of a statute of limitations for 
every absence of defendant from the State of Utah regardless of 
the availability of alternative methods of service under Rule 
4(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly applied §68-3-7, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in deciding that the first 
day of absence would be excluded and the last day of absence 
would be included. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about November 19, 1973, the Fourth Judicial 
District Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah, in the 
matter of Kamas State Bank v. Gail C. Van Tassell, Charles 0. 
Shaffer and Elwood C. Shaffer, entered a judgment for the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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plaintiff and against the defendants in the amount of $33,162.12. 
(R.104) 
On December 3, 1973, said court, in the same civil 
action, entered judgment as follows: 
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by the reason 
of the premises aforesaid, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That Gail C. Van Tassell have and recover 
from Elwood C. Shaffer a judgment for any and all 
sums paid by Gail C. Van Tassell to the plaintiff, 
Kamas State Bank, on the deficiency judgment of 
$33,162.12 entered herein by Kamas State Bank, 
together with interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
for any and all payments made on the judgment 
until reimbursed by Elwood C. Shaffer. 
2. That Gail C. Van Tassell have and recover 
from the defendant, Elwood C. Shaffer, a judgment 
in the sum of $17,889.00, together with interest 
at the rate of 8% per annum from the date hereof 
until paid, together with Van Tassell!s costs and 
disbursements in this action amounting to the sum 
of $105.00." (R.104) 
Thereafter, on February 1, 1974, the Kamas State Bank 
duly executed an assignment of judgment to Afton Van Tassell, 
wife of Gail C. Van Tassell, on the judgment entered on November 
19, 1973. (R.105) 
This action was commenced on February 5, 1982, for the 
renewal of the two judgments entered in November and December, 
1973.(R.105) 
The trial court in the instant matter, applying 
§68-3-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, that the 
defendant, Elwood C. Shaffer, was absent from, and outside the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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boundaries of the State of Utah for a period of 96 days* (R.106, 
107) 
Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment 
(R.25-26) which was heard before the Honorable Judith Billings on 
May 26, 1983. Judge Billings ruled that all times when the 
defendant was out of the State of Utah, after entry of 1973 
judgments, tolled the statute of limitation and was not a part of 
the period of time provided for before the commencement of an 
action upon said judgments. (R.90-91 & 99) 
The trial court further ruled that the day on which 
defendant left the State of Utah would not be included in the 
time of his absence and that the day on which he returned would 
be included. (R.106-107) 
After a trial on the merits, the court found that 
defendant was absent from the State of Utah for a total of 96 
days which was sufficient time to toll the statute of limitations 
and made plaintiffs1 filing timely. (R.107) 
The court further found that the amount due and owing 
on the judgment assigned to Afton Van Tassell is $61,681.44 and, 
the amount due and owing on the judgment of December 3, 1973, to 
Gail C. Van Tassell is $33,273.54, together with court costs in 
that action of $105.00. (R.107-110) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Absence from the State of Utah within the meaning of 
§78-12-35, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, means the 
physical absence of the defendant from the state. The Utah 
Supreme Court has long subscribed to the general rule that 
despite the availability of alternative methods of service, the 
statute of limitations is tolled by defendant's absence from this 
state. The Utah Supreme Court has steadfastly subscribed to this 
rule irrespective of the fact that during defendant's absence 
from the state of Utah, an actioBLj?.Q.uld have been commenced by 
serving his wife at the family residence. Defendant, in the 
present case, was absent from this state for a period of 96 days. 
Therefore, the trial court properly held that for said 96 days 
the statute of limitations was tolled, and that plaintiffs filed 
this action timely. 
The trial court properly applied §68-3-7, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. According to that section, the 
first day of defendant's absence from this state was excluded and 
the last day of defendant's absence was included. The trial 
courts findings regarding defendant's absence from this state 
were supported by substantial evidence, and therefore, must not 
be disturbed on this appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S ABSENCE FROM THE STATE TOLLED THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND, THEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS1 
ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT WAS TIMELY FILED. 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-12-35, 1953, as amended, 
provides as follows: 
"If when a cause of action accrues against a 
person when he is out of the state, the action may 
be commenced within the term herein limited after 
his return to the state; and if after a cause of 
action accrues he departs from the state, the time 
of his absence is not part of the time limited for 
the commencement of the action." 
This court was first called upon in the case of Lawson 
v. Tripp, 34 Utah 28, 95 P. 520 (1908), to apply a former Utah 
statute, §2888, which was identical to the current statute. In 
the Lawson case, which involved a breach of contract, this court 
stated as follows: 
"While a general rule is that statutes of limita-
tion generally are to be liberally construed, it 
is also a well-recognized doctrine that, when such 
statutes contain provisions excepting certain 
persons or classes from the operation of the 
statutes, those exceptions are to be strictly 
construed. And courts will not by construction 
extend the exception so as to include persons not 
expressly mentioned therein." Id. at 522. 
In the case of Keith O'Brien Co. v. Snyder, 51 Utah 
227, 169 P. 954, (Utah 1917), this court again held that 
defendant's absence from the state of Utah tolls the statute of 
limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, 
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notwithstanding the fact that defendant's family continued to 
live in this state. The court stated: 
It is, however, conceded that the 
defendant's family, consisting of his wife and 
minor children, continued to live in this state 
during all of the time that the defendant was out 
of the state and absent therefrom. It is 
contended that under our statute (Comp. Laws 1907, 
§2948, Subd. 8) an action could have been 
commenced against the defendant at any time by 
serving process on defendant's wife at the family 
residence or place of abode. The question, what 
effect shall be given to the provisions of section 
2888, supra, is therefore squarely presented. 
Defendant's counsel contends that the provisions 
of that section apply only to cases where neither 
the debtor nor his family have a place of abode or 
residence within the state so that process cannot 
be served, and that where, as in this case, pro-
cess can be served at the place of abode of his 
family, and thus an action can be commenced at any 
time, the running of the statute is not arrested 
by reason of the defendant's absence from the 
state. 
The cases cited from Iowa, Nebraska, 
Connecticut, and California are all based on 
statutes which, in legal effect, are like our 
section 2888, supra, which we have quoted in full. 
Notwithstanding the language of those statutes, 
however, it was held in those cases that mere 
absence from the state in the case the debtor 
could be served with process within the state 
would not arrest the running of the statute of 
limitations. The cases cited from Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, New Hampshire and Vermont are, 
however, based upon statutes that are quite 
different from ours. In Massachusetts the statute 
is arrested only in case the debtor is 'absent 
from and resides out of the state.' . . . Under 
all of the foregoing statutes, therefore, 
nonresidence of as well as absence from the state 
is necessary to toll the running of the statute. 
. . . Upon the other hand there are a large number 
of cases emanating from states where a statute 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
like ours is in force in which it is held that the 
full time that the debtor is out of the state and 
absent therefrom must be excluded in computing the 
time, and that such is the case notwithstanding 
the fact that the debtor's family may have a 
residence or place of abode in the state, and that 
service of process could be made upon some member 
of the debtor's family at its residence or place 
of abode"] 
Our statute is an exact transcript from the 
California statute, and in the case of Rogers v. 
Hatch, (44 CAL. 280), the rule applicable to the 
facts in the case at bar is stated in the 
following words: 
fIf, when the cause of action here accrues, 
the person against whom the same exists 
resides in the state, and he afterwards 
departs from the state, his successive 
absences from the state must be aggregated 
together and deducted from the whole time 
which has elapsed since the cause of action 
accrued, and the balance is the time the 
statute of limitations has run.111 
This general rule was affirmed by this court in Buell 
v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 231 P. 123, (Utah 1924). In that 
case the defendant unsuccessfully argued that his absence from 
the state should not toll the statute of limitation because he in 
fact maintained "a residence in the state, with persons residing 
there upon whom service of process might be made, prevented the 
tolling of the statute. That particular question has been 
determined by this court adversely to the contention of 
appellant." Keith 0fBrien Co., supra; Buell, supra. 
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In a later case, Gass v. Hunting, 561 P.2d 1071 (Utah 
1977) , the general rule was affirmed. The Utah Supreme Court in 
that case clearly and distinctly stated the rule as follows: 
"The statute and case quoted above seemed clear. 
A suit on a judgment may be commenced during the 
eight-year period following the entry thereof, and 
the debtor's absence from state tolls the 
eight-year period." 
Applying the reasoning behind the above-cited cases to 
the facts of the present case, it is evident that the trial 
courtfs ruling must be affirmed. The Utah State Legislature has 
expressed the will of the people by enacting §78-12-35. In 
accordance therewith, the Supreme Court has held that "an absence 
from the state tolls the eight-year period11. Gass, supra, at 
1072. 
It is undisputed that the defendant "absented himself 
from the state of Utah" for a period of 96 days. (R. 106-107) 
Since such time is not part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the instant action, which was filed on February 
5, 1982, (R.105) it is well within the limits provided for in 
said section. 
Despite the clear and unambiguous language of §78-12-35 
and the decisions of this court, defendant, in his brief, at 
pages 6 through 10, boldly seeks to overrule the cases cited 
herein and change the rule to which this court has subscribed 
since 1908. Specifically, the defendant is urging this.court to 
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amend §78-12-35 by inserting an exception into that section which 
the state legislature has declined to insert. To support his 
argument, defendant is relying upon Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d, 
254, at 390 P.2d 915 (Utah 1964). 
In Snyder, this court found that the non-resident 
motorist was not absent from the state, so as to toll the statute 
of limitations, because he had an agent authorized by law to 
receive service of process. The Snyder case, unlike the present 
case, involved the applicability of a special statute, §41-12-8, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The court, however, in that case was primarily 
concerned with preserving "the policy of law of allowing a 
reasonable time for the bringing of an action, but of providing a 
definite limitation of time in which it must be brought or the 
matter put at rest." Id. at 916. The court further expressed a 
concern that to accept plaintiff's argument with respect to the 
interpretation and application of §78-12-35 would permit the 
commencement of an action "10, 20 or any number of years" after 
the accrual of the cause of action. Id. 
It is hereby submitted that these concerns do not exist 
in the instant case. Arguably, had the Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that the statute of limitations is tolled while a non-resident 
motorist is absent from the state, an action involving such 
motorist could be suspended indefinitely. Assuming, for.the sake 
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of argument, that plaintiffs in this case had waited 96 more days 
before filing this action, and that defendant was within the 
state during such time; then plaintiffs1 action would have been 
barred by §78-12-22. 
In other words, this action is governed by a definite 
limitation of time in which it must be filed or it will be put to 
rest. It is that "definite limitation11 which concerned the court 
in the Snyder case. 
Defendantfs argument that plaintiffs should have 
availed themselves of the alternative method of service of 
process pursuant to Rule 4(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
must be rejected. The election of which method of service to 
utilize must be made by the plaintiffs. It is not within the 
province of defendant, nor the court, to dictate which method of 
service of process plaintiffs should elect. It is further 
submitted that accepting defendant's argument would inject a sour 
note into, and would not harmonize with, the policy of law of 
allowing a reasonable but definite limitation of time in which to 
file an action. Snyder, supra, at 916. 
Section 78-12-35, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, was transcribed verbatim from the California Code of 
Civil Procedure, §351- Therefore, decisions by the California 
Supreme Court regarding these issues must be afforded significant 
consideration by this court in resolving this matter. 
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In Dew v. Appleberry, 591 P.2d 509, (Cal. 1979), a tort 
action, the California Supreme Court held as follows: 
"We find no irreconcilable conflict between §351 
and the statutes governing substitute service. 
The Legislature may have justifiably concluded 
that defendant's physical absence impedes his 
availability for suit, and that it would be 
inequitable to force a claimant to pursue the 
defendant out of this state in order effectively 
to commence an action within the limitations. At 
the same time, by providing alternative forms of 
service, the Legislature simply encourages a 
plaintiff to adjudicate his claim expeditiously if 
possible; by using substitute service, a plaintiff 
may now obtain a binding judgment even in the 
defendant's absence. While the alternate service 
provision may lessen the need for §351, we do not 
believe that a repealed §351 pro tanto.11 Id., at 
513. 
Other jurisdictions have also concluded that a statute 
of limitations is subject to tolling statutes during the time 
defendant was absent from the particular jurisdiction. See 
Wetzel v. Weyant, 323 N.E. 2d 711, (Ohio 1975), Dicker v. 
Brinkley, 555 S.W. 495 (Tex. 1977); Loomis v. Skillerns-Loomis 
Plaza, Inc. 593 S.W. 2d 409 (Tex. 1980); Travis v. McGlaughlin, 
224 S.E. 2d 243 (M.C. 1976); and 55 A.L.R. 3d 1158, §4 (a). 
Though defendant did not abscond from the state of Utah 
to avoid service of process, he was, however, absent from the 
state for 96 days. (R.106-107). In calculating the time within 
which plaintiffs had to commence this action, credit must be 
given for said 96 days. And, that is exactly what the trial 
court did. Affording defendant the relief he prays for upon this 
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appeal is contrary to the general rule to which this court has 
long subscribed. 
Defendant's only concrete support for his position is 
the Snyder case. However, the cursory comparison of that case 
with the instant matter reveals one obvious difference, i.e., the 
special non-resident statute. That statute has no application to 
the instant case. Furthermore, a more thorough reading of 
Snyder, supra, reveals that, in that case, the Utah Supreme Court 
was concerned about the possibility that a purported claim may be 
preserved indefinitely after its origin; which !twould not comport 
with neither reason nor justice". Snyder, supra, at 916. The 
threat of the everlasting claim, strikes discord into the general 
policy of law to have all claims brought within reasonable but 
definite time. That is why the Snyder decision was proper under 
the given circumstances. However, the circumstances surrounding 
the present are distinctly different; and, therefore, the 
reasoning of Snyder must be limited to the facts of that case, 
must not be extended to all civil matters. 
Defendant laments about the plaintiffs' formal 
discovery to ascertain, among other things, information regarding 
defendant's absence from the State of Utah. (Defendant's brief, 
page 10.) The sum and substance of this charge is that the 
statute of limitations should be judicially amended to protect 
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defendant from having to comply with the formal demands for 
discovery in accordance with the general rules of discovery. 
If a party to an action abuses the discovery process, 
then the courts can, and should, issue appropriate orders to 
redress the abused party. Rule 26(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Such orders cannot be so expansive as to amend a 
valid statute, such as §78-12-35, just to appease a party who is 
unhappy about having to comply with proper demands for discovery. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH CODE CONTAINS A PROVISION THAT THE TIME 
IN WHICH ANY ACT PROVIDED BY LAW IS TO BE DONE IS 
COMPUTED IN DAYS. 
§68-3-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
provides as follows: 
"The time in which any act provided by law is to 
be done is computed by excluding the first day and 
including the last day, unless the last is a 
holiday and then it is also excluded." 
The trial court, in computing the days on which 
defendant was outside of the state of Utah, excluded the first 
day and included the last day. (R.106) This computation led the 
trial court to conclude that from December 3, 1973, through 
December 3, 1982, defendant was outside of this state for a 
period of 96 days. (R.107) 
In Gilroy v. Lowe, 626 P.2d 469 (1981), this court was 
asked to decide, among other things, whether an execution sale 
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took place within the prescribed time limitation. The court 
stated: 
"The method of computing time periods relating to 
acts provided for by law is set out in . 
§68-3-7 • . . When the time period is measured in 
months or years from a certain date, the day from 
which the time is to run is excluded and the same 
calendar date of the final month or year is 
included." Id. at 471. 
The language of §68-3-7 is clear and unambiguous, and 
has been literally applied by the Supreme Court. Regardless of 
how the time periods are measured, the first day is excluded and 
the last day is included. For example, if a defendant is out of 
the state for 30 days, the first day will not be be included in 
computing the time such defendant is absent from the state. 
Whereas the last day will be included in such computation. In 
other words, such a defendant, for the purpose of tolling the 
statute of limitation, would have been outside the state for 29 
days. 
Based upon §68-3-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, and the Supreme Court's decision regarding the 
computation of time, it is submitted that the trial court's 
decision must be upheld, and the defendant's argument upon this 
appeal must be rejected. 
It has long been recognized by this court that a trial 
court's findings and conclusions, if supported by substantial 
evidence, will not be disturbed upon appeal. Sine v. Salt Lake 
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Transportation Co,, 106 Utah 289, 147 P.2d 875-879, (1944). In a 
more recent case, Sharpe v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 671 
P.2d 185 (1983), this court stated the standard of review to be 
utilized on appeals is as follows: 
"In reviewing the findings and judgments of a 
trial court, after the trial on the merits, this 
court must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party, and judgment 
will be affirmed with the findings of fact are 
substantiated by the evidence." Id. at 187. 
See also Sohm v. Winegar, 565 P.2d 1134 (1977), where 
this court viewed the findings and judgment in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party; and, First Western Fidelity v. 
Gibbons & Reed Co. , 27 Utah 2d, 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971), where 
this court held that it must survey the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's findings. 
Applying the usual standard for review to the instant 
case, it is hereby submitted that when surveying the trial 
court's findings, with respect to the number of days defendant 
was absent from the State of Utah, in the light most favorable to 
plaintiffs, it is clear that said findings and judgment were 
supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, must not be 
disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
This court has long adhered to the general rule that 
the statute of limitations is tolled when the defendant is 
physically absent from the state of Utah. Defendant is now 
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urging this court to overrule decisions and cases upon which this 
court has stood since 1908. 
The case upon which defendant is supporting his 
argument is Snyder v. Clune, supra, a case which is factually 
distinguishable from the instant case, and, more importantly, a 
case in which this court addressed concerns that are not a part 
of the instant case. 
§78-12-35, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, is 
written in plain and unambiguous language and provides that "the 
time of (defendant's) absence (from the state) is not part of the 
time limited for the commencement of the action." The defendant 
is urging this court to act as a judicial legislature and amend 
said section. To amend a statute is a legislative power which is 
beyond the control of the judiciary. If the state legislature, 
when it enacted the sections in question, had desired to adopt 
the rule proposed by the defendant, then it could have done so; 
but it did not. Defendant should turn to the State Legislature, 
and not to this court, for the relief he seeks upon this appeal. 
The defendant was not available for service of process 
for 96 days throughout the eight years following the entry of 
judgments for plaintiffs. Taking into account such absence, 
plaintiffs' instant action to reaffirm said judgments was timely 
filed, and was not barred by the statute of limitations. The 
judgment of the trial court must, therefore, be affirmed. 
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The trial court properly ruled to exclude the first and 
include the last day in computing the actual days defendant was 
physically absent from the state. This ruling is in accordance 
with the mandate of §68-3-6. Hence, the trial court's findings, 
based upon said ruling, must also be affirmed. 
Dated this ^$L day of October, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
V&yyf^U'* ~b^ 
Thomas A Duffin 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Respondents 
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